This is a new thread established to discuss a topic that came up in the "Property Tax" thread, regarding the viability of privatizing a national defense. Feel free to continue the discussion here. I will post my own contribution soon, when I have more time to do so.
Incidentally, I found a PDF version of the Hans-Hermann essay here, for those who are interested:
http://www.libertarianstudies.org/journals/jls/pdfs/14_1/12hoppe.pdf
For the sake of continuity, below is a link to the posts on this topic made in the Property Tax thread.
Property Tax Thread
Remember, we are building a new system of government, different than any other system that has previously been conceived or tried. The founding fathers of the US were in a similar position in crafting a government that was completely unique relative to any other government of the time (almost unparalleled in all of history), and although the basic result was good overall, there were obviously weaknesses in the structure that have been exploited over time to limit freedom and lead to a more powerful and oppressive state. This is precisely what Joel is trying to prevent, in his proposed system, by expressly limiting the powers of the government to act solely *in defense of fundamental rights*. No other powers are allotted to or can be assumed by the government, except where fulfilling a need expressed by individuals, and where those individuals are paying for the service themselves, and have the freedom to opt out of the service of their own will. Let's see how this works regarding a national military defense.
First of all, the government does not have a monopoly on military services and defense. Provision is provided in this system for the funding and organization of private armies. This is necessary because of the nature of the national military. I refer you to Principle #8 of the Principles of Government -- read it carefully. Note that the national military only has power to act (and thus use general taxation resources) where there is a direct threat to the fundamental rights of the citizens. Any other action can only be made on a volunteer basis, by privately organized military groups, funded through an agreement by private citizens. A free market system could be used in this case, to aid other countries in their military endeavors for example. Simply placing the charge of national defense in the hands of a government based military does not take away any rights of the people to form their own defensive and offensive alliances (as long as such alliances are not used for the purpose of violating the fundamental rights of other citizens of the nation).
Now why is military defense (as herein defined and limited) best left to the government? Number one, because it is a natural extension of the citizen compact which forms the basis of the government. The creation of this unique type of government is in essence an extension of the free market, based upon the principle of contract. As in any contract, this one has two parts. The government promises to uphold and defend fundamental rights, and the citizens contract to support the government in this endeavor through taxes, military service, etc. In forming a government, then, the citizens form the structure which will uphold and defend their fundamental rights. That structure must necessarily have the power to enforce laws based on those rights, and to aggressively respond to any threats to those rights, inside and outside the nation. Unless there is a clear threat to fundamental rights, the government is given no power or authority -- individuals are free to conduct personal and business affairs without impingement. But the authority and power to act in response to violations of rights must be reserved for the government, which after all was formed on a unanimous basis by people who wish to maintain their fundamental rights.
Keep in mind also that not all dealings with opposing nations involve going to war. A significant part of overall national defense involves the designation of ambassadors and diplomats to negotiate with a potentially aggressive nation. The government is the institution created by the people to represent them, and the diplomats are essentially the front line of such representation. The military serves as a back-up to the authority of the diplomats, and a strong deterrent against actual foreign aggression. If you separate the military from the government, you take away all negotiation power from the diplomats, and thus leave them ultimately ineffective.
In terms of the proposal of leaving defense in the hands of private insurance companies, that proposal has a number of flaws in terms of practicality. The primary flaw involves the free-market premise of the system. If participation in a national defense is left to a voluntary basis, you have a high potential of encouraging free-riders in the system. A person can just decide to let "everyone else" pay for national defense, while he spends his money elsewhere. This presents two problems. One, volunteer funding may not be adequate (especially over the long term) to maintain a complete, effective defense. But even if the defense is adequately funded and fully implemented, if there is an attack and the privately-funded national defense does prove to be effective, those who opted out still receive the benefit of that successful defense without having paid for it! This is another reason why participation in funding a national defense cannot be left to the free market, but must be mandatory through taxation. Remember the limitations -- this "mandatory" contribution is only funding the basic defense of fundamental rights, which all in the nation benefit from simultaneously.
Celeste,
I'm in the middle of a move, or I would have replied already. Most of the issues you raise are laid neatly to rest in Hoppe's essay. I'm happy to address those not specifically answered--but not until things have settled down here. I don't know if you've taken the opportunity to read the essay; if you have, please let me know, so I can take that into account in my posts.
Thanks,
Patriot's Mother
What Hoppe is proposing is a completely different concept of society. Essentially, it is a type of anarchy, a system which would require considerable effort to adequately develop and prove feasible. This is particularly true given the lack of historical evidence supporting the long-term stability of a system of real anarchy. There are so many "what-if" scenarios that have to be analyzed and expanded on, in a purely theoretical sense, before it can be realistically considered. And while I think there are some interesting questions to explore in that direction, I personally don't think such discussion is within the scope of these particular forums. The purpose of these forums is to discuss the ideal foundations of a state based on a constitutionally limited government. Systems of anarchy lie on a completely different track, and such tangents would take this forum outside the realm of its purpose.
This is short, because I don't have the time to make it longer. It covers the important points.
1. I'm completely aware Hoppe frames his discussion with anarchy--his ideal. That's not the point. Hoppe has answers to your concerns, whether or not the privatization of defense happens under conditions of liberty or under government. (Human action is predictable in any given set of economic circumstances; hence the failures of controlled economies.)
2. A truly free territory has already been proven feasible. Premises, logic and conclusions rock solid and water tight. "Ethics of Liberty" by Murray Rothbard does a nice job. I can cite more if you'd like.
3. As for "long-term stability", name one leviathan that has been stable. (i.e. not tending from the outset to steal from and enslave its subjects.)
4. Lastly, "systems of anarchy" do not lie on a "completely different track". Anarchy is not chaos, nor is it unbridled violence and mayhem. It is self-government. Plain and simple. Give a bunch of people a set of rules, and then live and let live--or suffer the consequences.
(Quotes from Celeste's post are in bold. My replies are in plain text.)
First and foremost, here is Hoppe's reconstruction of the Hobbesian myth. Government is not a prerequisite to the rule of law. If you disagree, please defend your position, so we all can understand.
"The myth of collective security can also be called the Hobbesian myth. Thomas Hobbes, and countless political philosophers and economists after him, argued that in the state of nature, men would constantly be at each others' throats. Homo homini lupus est. Put in modern jargon, in the state of nature a permanent underproduction of security would prevail. Each individual, left to his own devices and provisions, would spend too little on his own defense, and hence, permanent interpersonal warfare would result. The solution to this presumably intolerable situation, according to Hobbes and his followers, is the institution of a state. In order to institute peaceful cooperation among themselves, two individuals, A and B, require a third independent party, S, as ultimate judge and peacemaker. However, this third party, S, is not just another individual, and the good provided by S, that of security, is not just another "private" good. Rather, S is a sovereign and has as such two unique powers. On the one hand, S can insist that his subjects, A and B, not seek protection from anyone but him; that is, S is a compulsory territorial monopolist of protection. On the other hand, S can determine unilaterally how much A and B must spend on their own security; that is, S has the power to impose taxes in order to provide security "collectively." In commenting on this argument, there is little use in quarreling over whether man is as bad and wolf-like as Hobbes supposes, except to note that Hobbes's thesis obviously cannot mean that man is driven only and exclusively by aggressive instincts. If this were the case, mankind would have died out long ago. The fact that he did not demonstrates that man also possesses reason and is capable of constraining his natural impulses. The quarrel is only with the Hobbesian solution. Given man's nature as a rational animal, is the proposed solution to the problem of insecurity an improvement? Can the institution of a state reduce aggressive behavior and promote peaceful cooperation, and thus provide for better private security and protection? The difficulties with Hobbes's argument are obvious. For one, regardless of how bad men are, S-—whether king, dictator, or elected president—-is still one of them. Man's nature is not transformed upon becoming S. Yet how can there be better protection for A and B, if S must tax them in order to provide it? Is there not a contradiction within the very construction of S as an expropriating property protector? In fact, is this not exactly what is also—-and more appropriately—-referred to as a protection racket? To be sure, S will make peace between A and B but only so that he himself in turn can rob both of them more profitably. Surely S is better protected, but the more he is protected, the less A and B are protected from attacks by S. Collective security, it would seem, is not better than private security. Rather, it is the private security of the state, S, achieved through the expropriation, i.e., the economic disarmament, of its subjects. Further, statists from Thomas Hobbes to James Buchanan have argued that a protective state S would come about as the result of some sort of "constitutional" contract. Yet, who in his right mind would agree to a contract that allowed one's protector to determine unilaterally-—and irrevocably-—the sum that the protected must pay for his protection; and the fact is, no one ever has!"
Journal of Libertarian Studies 14:1 (Winter 1998–1999): 27–52
©1999 Center for Libertarian Studies The Private Production of Defense
Secondly, here is my rebuttal to Celeste's Aug. 11 post. It's probably the longest in existence, but I don't think forum readers will find it boring. Plow on!
"Remember, we are building a new system of government, different than any other system that has previously been conceived or tried."
After carefully reading the New Constitution of Liberty, it is fairly plain to see that it is closely based on the original Constitution of the United States. Yes, it has far tighter legal language, but it has the same basic structure and checks and balances. Therefore, the "new system of government, different than any other system . . . previously conceived or tried" is not so. The "new system" is simply the old system, greatly revised and armored against today's legal and bureaucratic predators.
"The founding fathers of the US were in a similar position in crafting a government that was completely unique relative to any other government of the time (almost unparalleled in all of history), and although the basic result was good overall, there were obviously weaknesses in the structure that have been exploited over time to limit freedom and lead to a more powerful and oppressive state."
Exactly. The founding fathers made a vital evolutionary and revolutionary step in the process toward true liberty. They changed the way people thought about life, and living under a tyrant's rule. However, the failure of the Great American Experiment shows clearly that government cannot be trusted, and will not behave.
This is precisely what Joel is trying to prevent, in his proposed system, by expressly limiting the powers of the government to act solely *in defense of fundamental rights*.
The Founding Fathers, for whom I have the greatest respect, did their best to set up a government that would protect the fundamental rights of its citizens. But the very nature of government–however it is structured–has proven throughout history to be the worst culprit in proscribing and outright confiscating the liberties of its subjects. Remember, the "government" is composed simply of people. Anything the government can do in its artificially constructed economic environment can be done better by the private sector or free market.
No other powers are allotted to or can be assumed by the government, except where fulfilling a need expressed by individuals, and where those individuals are paying for the service themselves, and have the freedom to opt out of the service of their own will.
So, the freedom to opt out is protected, except when it comes to services that the state feels should be paid for by all–such as defense?
Let's see how this works regarding a national military defense. First of all, the government does not have a monopoly on military services and defense.
I beg to differ. Whenever the government confiscates funds to provide a service, they create a monopoly; not because they are forcing their subjects to choose only their service, but because they are forcing them to pay for that service. If I were to force you, on a continuing basis, to pay me for mowing your lawn, and then do a shoddy job, would you feel like paying somebody else to do the job better–greatly increasing your costs? No, you'd want to make me do it right. However in the national arena, there is no recourse for individuals. Pay nicely, or have it taken from you, one drop of blood at a time. The definition of politics is the place of violence in human affairs. A state is given the power to use violence with impunity in the affairs of its subjects whenever they don't comply with the state's wishes.
Provision is provided in this system for the funding and organization of private armies.
That doesn't fix the monopolistic environment. That's just like the educational system today–you are forced pay for it, but the power mongers insist it's great that you are still free to pay for it again. Some consolation that is. Secondly, nobody's going to want to organize a private national defense if the state already has one. The state would insist it regulate many things about the private armies, since they will need to work "in concert" with the existing national forces, or for some other excuse. Once the government has its sticky fingers in ANY industry, it WILL regulate it out of any form of natural market operation. (i.e. OSHA, Health Department, etc.)
This is necessary because of the nature of the national military. I refer you to Principle #8 of the Principles of Government -- read it carefully. Note that the national military only has power to act (and thus use general taxation resources) where there is a direct threat to the fundamental rights of the citizens. Any other action can only be made on a volunteer basis, by privately organized military groups, funded through an agreement by private citizens. A free market system could be used in this case, to aid other countries in their military endeavors for example.
So we will have a tax-expensive, huge military that sits around most of the time, waiting for a direct threat to the fundamental rights of the citizens. Who is to decide what a direct threat is? Why is "allowing" private funding of military organizations necessary? Will people feel the need to go bomb Bosnia again? Ordinary people don't want to get into wars, as opposed to political powers. Private funding of foreign military aid has always been an option. It hasn't happened for two reasons: it is illegal to traffic in any military-style weaponry, and the private sector is already paying for it. Besides, I don't think the UN likes competition for the media's praise.
Simply placing the charge of national defense in the hands of a government based military does not take away any rights of the people to form their own defensive and offensive alliances (as long as such alliances are not used for the purpose of violating the fundamental rights of other citizens of the nation).
No, it doesn't remove rights–but it does remove power. Rights are of necessity defined by what any being has within its power to do. Nobody has the "right" to leap tall buildings in a single bound simply because it's humanly impossible. However we do have the power, or ability, to work and build a building. Whenever you place the charge of anything in the government's hands, you remove the economic power from the individual to perform that same function because of the taxation necessary to support that government function. Not only that, but when you turn defense over to Big Brother, a social climate of anti-vigilante sentiment, and a collective phobia of taking the law into one's own hands results. "What, isn't the military we've already got good enough for you?" I have made certain dietary decisions based on my own health and well-being in the last year; you wouldn't believe the flak I've received from others because it offends them that I don't eat the same way they do. Can you imagine that same social dynamic on the scale of national defense?
Now why is military defense (as herein defined and limited) best left to the government? Number one, because it is a natural extension of the citizen compact which forms the basis of the government. The creation of this unique type of government is in essence an extension of the free market, based upon the principle of contract. As in any contract, this one has two parts. The government promises to uphold and defend fundamental rights, and the citizens contract to support the government in this endeavor through taxes, military service, etc.
We all know how effective governmental "promises" are–about as good as a cat promising to guard the goldfish. In forming such a contract, you agree to pay the government as much as your neighbors or the government thinks you should–for services whose quality is wholly decided by the government.
"Is there not a contradiction within the very construction of S as an expropriating property protector? In fact, is this not exactly what is also—and more appropriately—referred to as a protection racket? To be sure, S will make peace between A and B but only so that he himself in turn can rob both of them more profitably." (Ibid.)
In forming a government, then, the citizens form the structure which will uphold and defend their fundamental rights.
And this has happened when . . . . ? Wishful thinking will not change the nature of man.
That structure must necessarily have the power to enforce laws based on those rights, and to aggressively respond to any threats to those rights, inside and outside the nation.
Until the lion has neither teeth nor claws, fear his roar.
Unless there is a clear threat to fundamental rights, the government is given no power or authority -- individuals are free to conduct personal and business affairs without impingement. But the authority and power to act in response to violations of rights must be reserved for the government, which after all was formed on a unanimous basis by people who wish to maintain their fundamental rights.
So, if "the authority and power to act in response to violations of rights must be reserved to government", what message does that broadcast in regards to self-defense? This still promulgates the concept of "Big Brother". The lulling promise of: "Government will protect you" has been the death knoll of many a liberty.
Keep in mind also that not all dealings with opposing nations involve going to war. A significant part of overall national defense involves the designation of ambassadors and diplomats to negotiate with a potentially aggressive nation.
"Negotiation" is simply capitulation in small stages. If a "potentially aggressive nation" exists, simple deterrents–such as the promise of swift, fatal, personal retaliation–suffice. Potentials for aggression exist in every person; the only way to protect oneself from aggression is to deter it forcibly–not talk nice to whoever's holding the club. They couldn't care less—unless you have the ability to retaliate with greater force.
The government is the institution created by the people to represent them,
Yes, but to represent them to whom? In a domestic arena the government, made up of people, of citizens, represents the people to themselves? It's people oppressing one another in the name of freedom. In the international arena, a government only serves to move its subjects into a world government.
"Once it is assumed that in order to institute peaceful cooperation between A and B it is necessary to have a state S, a two-fold conclusion follows. If more than one state exists, S1, S2, S3, then, just as there can presumably be no peace among A and B without S, so there can be no peace between the states S1, S2, and S3 as long as they remain in a state of nature (i.e., a state of anarchy) with regard to each other. Consequently, in order to achieve universal peace, political centralization, unification, and ultimately the establishment of a single world government are necessary. . . . The world state is the winner of all wars and the last surviving protection racket. Doesn't this make it particularly dangerous? And will not the physical power of any single world government be overwhelming as compared to that of any one of its individual subjects?" (Ibid.)
and the diplomats are essentially the front line of such representation.
For what purpose? What dealings are necessary outside of one individual or business with another? This smacks highly of potential "impingement".
The military serves as a back-up to the authority of the diplomats, and a strong deterrent against actual foreign aggression.
I repeat–the only deterrent necessary is that promise of retaliation; not against the inanimate objects and innocent inhabitants of a nation, but against those responsible for the act of aggression itself. And, in your own words, if force is "a strong deterrent", (and I would hold the only necessary deterrent), then there exists no need for diplomats.
If you separate the military from the government, you take away all negotiation power from the diplomats, and thus leave them ultimately ineffective.
Good! I don't want them promising things that I'm not willing to do, making "deals" to appease greedy and dishonest tyrants. Case in point: I haven't signed any of the treaties in force today, but I'm paying for them. How is that defending my fundamental rights? It's not. Diplomats sign away the fruit of my labor, my economic ability, my power to exercise my fundamental rights.
In terms of the proposal of leaving defense in the hands of private insurance companies, that proposal has a number of flaws in terms of practicality. The primary flaw involves the free-market premise of the system.
I believe Hans Herman-Hoppe would beg to differ, as do I.
If participation in a national defense is left to a voluntary basis, you have a high potential of encouraging free-riders in the system. A person can just decide to let "everyone else" pay for national defense, while he spends his money elsewhere.
You make the situation out to be such that a person will make the defense decision in a vacuum, ignoring the fact that he will experience pressure from friends and neighbors, not to mention being left to suffer the consequences of an inadequate defense force, whether domestic or national. He will be a target, and he will know it. But wait, I forgot–individuals aren't smart enough to make their own decisions. Perish the thought of individual accountability! (And never mind that simple tenet vital to liberty–-the freedom to spend one's money elsewhere.)
There are two fairly standard reactions to the option of defense insurance: 1) people will think, realize there is a need for such a thing, and take out policies; and 2) other people won't think, and will largely ignore the whole concept–until the insurance companies' advertising campaigns about the need for defense insurance on both the local and national levels convince them otherwise. People are so conditioned to accept whatever the media feeds them that I'm sure the insurance agencies won't bat an eyelash at a cool billion, or a few billion, for TV and radio ads. They'll have the more comatose portion of the population knocking down their doors within hours.
This presents two problems. One, volunteer funding may not be adequate (especially over the long term) to maintain a complete, effective defense.
We're not talking about a group of individuals pooling their pennies—we're talking about an established and ridiculously profitable industry expanding its services. The current insurance industry has more than adequate monetary reserves to purchase several entire armies, lock, stock and barrel. If the people aren't far-sighted enough to pay for defense insurance, they should feel the consequences of their decisions.
But even if the defense is adequately funded and fully implemented, if there is an attack and the privately-funded national defense does prove to be effective, those who opted out still receive the benefit of that successful defense without having paid for it!
Exactly! They have benefitted from a market externality. That's not evil, or immoral, or even dishonest. It's a fact of life. No individual should be coerced into "contributing". There are plenty of natural incentives in the free market alone to do that job just fine. (Hoppe outlines all of them very well.)
This is another reason why participation in funding a national defense cannot be left to the free market, but must be mandatory through taxation. Remember the limitations -- this "mandatory" contribution is only funding the basic defense of fundamental rights, which all in the nation benefit from simultaneously.
So it's okay to steal on a grandiose scale under the cry "It's for your own good!"? It's perfectly permissible to embezzle monstrously–but only just this once. That's absurd. These "free-riders" as you call them are not so. Free riders are those who ask for a benefit, and then expect others to pay for it. You're describing a market externality, and quoting the exact same line the socialist economists recite. An externality is defined as a market transaction's effect on a third party uninvolved with the original transaction. (The principle upon which the entire stock market, not to mention the rest of the economy, happens to be based.) So, those who don't undergo vaccinations, and don't contract chicken pox or measles or rubella or pertussis due to decreased incidence of any given disease as a result of increased vaccinations in others should compensate those vaccinee's for the cost of the shots. The owner of the gas station across from the Provo Towne Centre should pay the mall owner a percentage of his increased profits due to the greater traffic drawn by the mall-goers; ditto with the McDonald's and K-Mart and hotel owners. You're saying that if my neighbor improves his property, thereby increasing the value of my own, I should pay him a portion of my profits, should I ever sell–or even pay him a percentage of the greater appraised value. You're saying I should pay a portion of my neighbor's expense in owning and maintaining his watchdog, because I benefit from the dog's proximity. May I repeat myself? Don't be absurd.
The Founding Fathers did something revolutionary, and made an important evolutionary step in the process toward true liberty. Now it's our turn to do the same–not repeat their steps, and hope for a different outcome.
Interesting . . .
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rockwell/military.html
http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/peirce4.html
I'm not the only one that thinks a smaller milita-based military is possible and practical.
The Elkins Doctrine